Proactive Influence Operations & the Broken Paradigm of DIME

Proactive Influence Operations & the Broken Paradigm of DIME

 

 

I noted a few weeks back I’d have a blog on influence operations.  The reason for this blog post is because I’ve seen the term “influence operations” bucketized into a bin that equates it mostly with psychological or military information support operations (PsyOPs or MISO). 

The objective of this post is to provide a different perspective of what influence operations encompass. If we accept my broader premise, proactive influence operations can and will serve as one of the most powerful tools we employ in the Cognitive Domain.  It will also mean the end of the Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics (or DIME) model. 

The Cognitive Domain is the primary battle ground between freedom, independence and opportunity and tyranny that is exemplified by our great power competitors. The secondary intent of expanding the view of what entails influence operations – is so that we can actually compete with, and succeed against, nation state and radical adversary’s, as we continue to stumble, trip and fall – in getting our feet under us in the current ongoing Cognitive War. 

It’s important to understand the broader definition of influence operations, much as it is to understand the broader definition of open source information.  Our Intelligence Community (IC) serves as fine example in their use of the term Open Source INTelligence or OSINT.  But the world doesn’t work in silos. Just like our Intelligence Community tries to bin all source information available to the public in a bucket called OSINT.  The reality is that the bulk of information we need (98-99.9%) to make our decisions is unclassified. It may be protected, but it’s unclassified. 

 

Industrial Age Mindsets -

But our IC was founded in the industrial age, and continues to teach and act using industrial age approaches and tradecraft that promote sustainment of what I call “Titanium Cylinders of Sub-Excellence.”  There is a natural tendency, using the industrial age construct, to want to place things into buckets to better “control” (another industrial age cultural issue to be addressed in other posts) the access, use and dissemination of information – to include open source – or rather “information.”  This bucketizing removes the timely use, sharing and therefor relevance of the information.

The same industrial age mindset is also being applied to “influence operations.”  Our DoD, also created and built during the industrial age, like our IC, has also placed influence and information operations into the buckets or MISO or IW/IO.  Like our IC, the DoD is applying tradecraft and doctrine from seventy-years ago to influence operations or activities that go well beyond the buckets we’ve placed them. 

Examples of Influence Ops -

So how do I view influence operations?  I see them occurring in the open daily, via multiple different ways and means, nefarious and value added.  They occur in all functional realms, in our education, economic, technical, social, terrorist, military, etc. 

Let’s give a few examples to help clarify:

• ·         9-11 – a nefarious but massive influence operation. 
• ·         Political campaigning – it’s all about influencing others to vote for your candidate  
• ·         Social like the current Covid 19 campaign to wear masks, not work or work
• ·         Environmental as in the green movement, save the whales, clean water
• ·         Educational as in teaching about founding fathers as leaders or racists
• ·         Agricultural trade wars between China and the US, Australia and China
• ·         Technological change like iPhone, droids, gaming - subtle or shocking
• ·         Trade Center and Boston Bombings
• ·         ISIS recruiting campaigns and reigns of terror
• ·         Civil rights marches, promoting equal rights
• ·         Peer pressure – drugs, no drugs
• ·         China Flu – Covid19 – pandemic
• ·         China’s economic, R&D, educational etc. thefts
• ·         Russian’s annexation of the Crimea

 

Subtle or Blunt -

The list is as endless as our thoughts and actions during the day as should our view of what influence operations encompass.  Influence can be very subtle – the frown on your significant others face.  Or influence can be blunt, like the removal general Sistani in Iran. 

Tactical or Strategic -

Influence operations occur across the spectrum of time. The removal of Sistani was a tactical effort, but with strategic influence – as it moved Iran to take a more cautious approach.  The Cold War was a strategic effort in influencing via a strategy of containment. 

Avoiding Our Own Buckets –

Why do we then look at influence operations in such a narrow view and put it into buckets?  It’s akin to our DoD and IC buying a new house – and only taking a look at the one page flyer that the relator hands you.  The one with a price on it, square footage, number of rooms, etc.  And then we decide?

Our adversaries live under no such constraints.  Using the same analogy, they looked at the flyer but then they took a few additional steps. First, they ran a criminal check on the realtor.  They did an environmental check and study on the grounds the house sits on.  They did a full walk around with a licensed inspector(s), to see first-hand the pluses, problems, and then they looked at listings in the area to assess prices to compare.  Finally, they looked at the schools, level of crime, travel time to work etc.

The point being – we place our tradecraft, doctrine and actions into silos and approaches in a manner that restricts, hinders and keeps us in our buckets.  Our adversaries have no such constraints. The same is true for how we view influence measures – we’re stuck in our silos.  Our adversaries are not – so they constantly outmaneuver us. 

Policy Hurdles -

So we must redefine and reeducate ourselves on what it means when we say we’re conducting, planning for, or implementing influence campaigns.  The Privacy Act, Open Source policies, and Smith Munn Act are just a few of our self-imposed policies that preclude us from fully utilizing the potential of influence campaigns.

Our industrial age policies include Title 10, Title 50 and Title 22, all which “bucketized” the operations of our DoD, IC and Department of State into Titanium Cylinders of Sub-Excellence that exist today.  While our adversaries regularly employ successful “whole of government/nation” campaigns of influence that are multi-faceted, multi-levels, complex and cut across multiple functional areas – we remain playing checkers one move, one piece at a time. 

Why DIME is dead -

This brings me to another bucket in which we’ve placed the above buckets – the DIME model conceives of using Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics as an organizing concept for overall US government actions.  DIME has runs its usefulness.  Just like the laws and titles noted above.  It’s better than the silos, but is inadequate to fuller operations in the Information age.  DIME fails to capture the fuller array of ways, means and efforts to influence our adversaries, advance our narrative, or effectively congeal and integrate the fuller power of our nation and allies into competitive strategies to compete and out maneuver our adversaries.  Do I have a replacement yet? No. Open to suggestions. 

My Theory of the Information Equilibrium © 1996-2020 https://theinformationequilibrium.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-information-equilibrium-original.html discusses this at a macro level 

I define the Concept of the Information Equilibrium as: 

 

The transfer of knowledge, through the use of information based sources, technologies and services, which leads to an eventual equilibrium of the world's social, political, and economic situations. Such an equilibrium is based upon the involvement of the public, private, and non-profit sectors.  I use the word knowledge vice information on purpose.  Much information can be passed on, but it is the formation of the information into useful concepts, ideas or actions that denotes actual knowledge.  The base concept suggests that if one strives for the greatest access and distribution of information throughout the world by all peoples, the eventual result will be the transfusion of knowledge and ideas such that the world's general economic, social, and political development will move toward an equilibrium.

In the most simple of terms, the 

Theory of the Information Equilibrium proffers that the balance between societies that advance/advocate for freedom, opportunity, democracy, individual rights and those that advance dictatorships, tyranny, autocracies, etc. lay in either the flow or constriction of information in line with the Concept of the Information Equilibrium.  

 The more open the flow, the equilibrium will shift balance towards democracy and freedom; the more constricted the flow of information the balance shifts towards dictatorships, despots, theocracies, etc.  

DIME, like MISO, like OSINT, like PsyOps fails to capture the fuller possibilities in the use of knowledge, information, functions, physical and non-physical means to not only compete with – but ensure success against our adversaries in this ongoing Cognitive War.  Just like our Department of State can’t do it all, neither can we as a nation.  We must move and facilitate a world-wide network in order to leverage all facets of influence – but we must do so in sync with one another. 

Our efforts must advance influence operations via all forms of functions and networks – influencers, instigators, followers, political, economic, environmental, etc.

The Nefarious Networks -

Why do you think it is, when we dig into the tactics and networks of our adversaries and ways they seek to influence our actions/drive us to react, that we tend to find the same underlying set of players and networks?  We find the drug rings, human traffickers, proliferators, criminal mafias, illegal arms dealers, etc.  Each of these sub-networks enables and ties to the others – and they do so worldwide.  But, because we’ve bucketized our defenses into the DEA, DoD, IC, State, etc. we end up competing with ourselves, to achieve the same desired end (destroying the bad guys). 

Competing with Ourselves –

We must understand how our adversaries, and the nefarious actors, operate. They operate in a world of one, multiple, and integrated networks.  They operate in the paradigm of the “information equilibrium.”   But we – we operate in silos!  Rather than advancing the power of the whole, to conduct proactive influence operations across multiple fronts, nationally and internationally, we spend the majority of our time, resources and efforts competing with ourselves, outmaneuvering each of the other silos, and giving our adversaries near free reign to operate, disrupt and impede our efforts.

I’ve written, spoke and posted about competing in the cognitive domain often.  We remain focused on mostly tactical and reactive, whereas we could move beyond the industrial age concepts of DIME, OSINT, and MISO – to advance fuller influence operations that are strategic in nature, cross administrations and political party politics, and leverage the whole of our and our allies’ capabilities and capacity.  As we’ve seen in the world’s response to China’s disinformation campaign on the China Flu (aka Covid19), we can be very successful in ensuring truth over fiction. Right over wrong. Freedom over tyranny. 

So, I began this article noting that I’d offer a wider berth for what encompasses the term “influence operations.”  We must look at how we use the “whole of government” information sets/data, the other Departments like Agriculture, HHS, US AID, NGO’s, allies, etc. to advance proactive, truthful and impactful influence operations. 

Much like an intervention with a drug addict – we’ll find our efforts against our adversaries works sometimes, and sometimes not.  But then we will learn, and employ other active measures including physical actions, kinetic, or economic or to drives / influence our adversaries in the direction we desire. In either case, it takes planning, a strategy, and use of the right mix of expertise.  That means more than one silo.

To ensure the best application of influence we must map out the varied networks of the both the nefarious and legal players.  We must identify the key players and influencers in those networks.  Then we can understand the best means and methods most likely to achieve the influence we desire.  We must also figure out, the greatest influence is both focused and from the masses.  Focused in influencing key players, and masses in terms of using the native populations in influencing our adversaries. 

In some cases it may take years to move and influence, others seconds with a kinetic message – you remove those that are not able to be changed – but like in Iran with Sistani we must also understand the 2^nd and third order effects. 

We must map out (like on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, TikTo0, WeChat and others like we do for proliferation rings, etc.) the leaders, the followers, the influencers, the bots and the echo chambers  -- but on a grand scale.

The real battle is in the worlds’ broader cognitive domain – influencing across boundaries to favor the balance of our values and freedoms vs the influence of others for control and tyranny.  We must use a broader understanding of influence operations, just as we must use a broader understanding of open source and we must come up with another term besides DIME that moves us out of industrial age tradecraft, mindsets, laws, silos and policies – and moves into the information age, so that we can compete and move the balance of the Information Equilibrium permanently in favor of freedom, independence and opportunity.   

©️ 2020, Edward L. Haugland LLC, All Rights Reserved