Killing Putin

 

Killing Putin

How do we incentivize his people to do the best thing for Russia and the world?

·       First, we must realize we lost the cold war once this war started. When we walked away from the black market driven former Soviet Union, we walked away from several countries whose people sought to ensure the removal of the yoke of tyranny. We lost the Cognitive War, and now have lost the battle we call the Cold War. We have more in common with average Russians - as they seek to be free from tyranny that is run their country for centuries. Yet, we closed shop on being able to compete and maintain stability in the ongoing Cognitive War.

·        Second, Russians tasted the wickedness/murder of Lenin, Stalin, and others - so they know now what they have. They just need help to move to the next level of freedom. As we have seen and hear, their troops have absolutely no incentive to invade Ukraine. And the Russian people will grow increasingly alarmed and disenfranchised as their children come home in body bags for an unnecessary war. But what are we doing to drive and influence that situation – nothing. Our DOD and IC are inept and incapable of advancing a strong, positive, narrative for what must be. They default once again, in their reactive posture, to the dystopian dictators to define our future – vice us taking the necessary steps to define the future as we wish.

·         Third, world leaders must put together an incentive package that leverages the Russian engineering, science, and culture an alliance with the West to make Russia great again - remove Putin & Oligarchs. Incentives can do wonderous things. Will our socialist media companies, who whore themselves out to the dystopian dictators by allowing free reign of trolls, propaganda, disinformation, and spies on their platforms (while censoring conservatives, the truth, and facts) step up and help create a go-fund page for the removal of Putin and his oligarchs? We can fund and support those who do. As to the manner of removal and means we should be agnostic.

America must realize, we have been in a war simply put between evil and good, tyranny and freedom, and it has been ongoing since man was created. It will continue until man no longer exists. It is a Cognitive War – which leverages ideologies as the means to their end – to either advance tyranny or freedom. It is a war which is both domestic, as well as international. As man is and can be evil – and there are those who seek absolute power to control on one side – versus those who look to enable their fellow man and their freedom and independence.

Four years ago – I projected the current situation and issues we face with both China and Russia by stating … in a paper I wrote for the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community on “The Cognitive War.”

Unless we adjust our future…to account for the paradigm shifts that have occurred under our feet, our nation and its intelligence operations will once again awaken too late, to a different reality, which is likely to end badly with significant and long-term impacts to our nation’s security and place as world leader. 

I project such a negative and reactive outcome to occur either because we lost the cognitive war totally, our adversaries succeed undermining our institutions and democratic foundation to such an extent they are no longer viable, or, because our efforts to counter in the cognitive domain came too late. 

If we fail to act in the cognitive domain, we will likely end up in a major kinetic conflict resulting in devastating outcomes, in physical and human toll – recovery is questionable. 

© Edward L. Haugland, February 2019

Despite such warnings, and a thorough analysis and discussion of how to succeed in winning the Cognitive War, our national security apparatus has remained stuck in failing to address the four key findings of that paper:

•      The IC and DoD, created in 1947, continue to function in a primarily reactive posture, using the industrial age processes of the era in which they were created. Our IC and DoD were created during the industrial age, by the National Security Act of 1947. Their structure and functional roles were respectively to prepare for war and providing Indications and Warning (I&W). These functions are inherently reactive. Proactive influence requires significant forethought, well thought strategy, and sustaining strategic planning priorities. Strategy drives tactical efforts towards desired impact, influence, and outcome. However, our tendency (perception and reality) is to chase the new “shiny objects” (e.g., AI/ML, Cyber, etc.), throw solutions at the wall, see what sticks, and then repeat. We tend to operate as glorified reactive action officers, whereby we create crises, solve the immediate crises, pat ourselves on the back, then repeat – vice, looking and planning strategically and driving tactical efforts in line with strategy. The processes remain mostly unchanged and stick in the industrial age. In other words, we are waiting for the paradigm or environment to change, rather than taking a proactive approach and driving the change outcomes we desire. To enable and provide future successful and effective intelligence operations, we must move from a predominately reactive to proactive posture.

·         Information & democratization of technology has changed the character of warfare. A 2017 memorandum (Appendix A: Information as a Joint Function, September 15, 2017) from the SECDEF created “Information” as the seventh joint function states “…Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information technology…have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modem warfare...the elevation of Information to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across doctrine, organization.”  Despite the plethora of new data and information sources, advances in information technology to utilize such information, we continue to react/respond to every new threat, new technology, new data, or new adversarial capability. Rather, we need to take a step back, think through and clearly define the problem, the type of functions or approaches that can be applied, identify, and allocate the right type of expertise and resources, and then ensure we follow the motto “form to function.”  Our current approach tends to view technology as part of the problem. We must understand that technology is not the problem, it’s defining the problem.

•      2018 National Security and Defense Security Strategies address the new character of warfare. The 2018 NSS states “…Majority of adversary efforts in Competition phase (short of armed conflict) ... (are) challenging our ability to deter aggression.”  It is in the cognitive realm we are losing the ideological war on multiple fronts, we are losing our intellectual property, our adversaries are outmaneuvering us, and we are failing to achieve overmatch because we focus solely on kinetic options. While the kinetic is important, if we lose the cognitive war, it is unlikely we will ever reach kinetic action. The dangers surpass any challenges we have faced in our history, as the NSS speaks to the new and startling reality of modern warfare stating, “It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.”   Our biggest challenge, is that we are in the midst of a cognitive war that will last a millennium or longer, and our focus remains near solely on kinetic.

•      Immediate investments are required to enable the success and effectiveness of future intelligence operations in 2035-2050 and beyond. The key areas of investment include Architecture & Infrastructure; Communication; Human Capital; Information Access & Cognition: Proactive Influence/Predicative Analytics; and Integration / Leverage with others. These investments are required to build a foundation that enables proactive influence and predictive analysis. They enable a foundation that is critical to conducting cognitive warfare, outmaneuvering adversaries in the battle between ideologies, and significantly shortening our OODA loop. In turn, such a foundation can enable and optimize conduct of kinetic action and enhance the effectiveness of post-competition/kinetic efforts to stabilize an area or region. The greatest challenges to advancing successful future intelligence operations is not our adversaries, their capabilities, access to information, nor technology. We must understand our biggest hurdles are cultural (policy) and structural (organizational), requiring an overhaul of our production lines and building a new factory floor.

The BLUF is therefore, we can choose to advance efforts to compete and win this ongoing Cognitive War, and not just succeed but proactively influence outcomes to match our national security goals and objectives, or we can we fail to undertake these investments and adjustments to advance proactive influence and predictive analysis in the cognitive domain. If we fail to act, we will likely remain in a perpetual reactive posture. The status quo is a losing posture and proposition, guaranteed to see our institutions further undermined, alliances challenged, and military and economic dominance further diminished. If we do not change, we are most likely to end in a cycle of kinetic actions/wars.

It is time for our leadership to realize the massive failure of both our IC and DOD in their ability to compete in the cognitive domain and advance any success in the ongoing Cognitive War. Our IC missed the ChinaFlu. Our DoD missed the lessons of Afghanistan and got stuck playing whack a mole terrorist for two-decades. Why? Because they are fighting the last war – WWII in perpetuity – with the same structures (organizations) and cultures (policy) they have used since the end of WWI and the start of the industrial age. All while our adversaries watched, learned, and refined their capabilities and capacity to leverage the democratization of technology to compete and win in the cognitive war. We must be to overhaul our fuller national security apparatus, from the DOD, IC, DOJ, DOS, and others – to create and build the capacity and capabilities to execute a viable and proactive offense in this ongoing Cognitive War.

© 2022, Edward L. Haugland, All Rights Reserved