Covid-19 – The Worst Intelligence Failure in 100 years? Probably!
We
must ask the simple question. Why did Taiwan, Hong Kong and S. Korea respond
quickly and protect against the spread of the virus, yet our IC did not report
or respond (at least what is in the open) until late January 2020? And worse, if we did know, but we over
classified, the reporting was irrelevant and useless as the information – if provided
– was not on time nor useful to drive proactive efforts to protect our nation.
Second, the delay in understanding and responding to the massive Chinese disinformation
campaign was a secondary blemish at first.
In this case the response has been effective.
Cultures
protect themselves. It is not because the professionals are not doing their
job. It is because the culture (policy)
and structure (organization) do not enable action nor innovation.
Open
sources began reporting in mid-December or earlier, but our IC is geared to
react, not to drive proactive operations to preclude impact. It was built for I&W – indications and
warning – and therein lies the major fault.
In the information age, that is death. As it is a reactive posture. When you only react, you are on defense. When
you only play defense, you lose.
The
need for an overhaul of our IC is glaring.
We know about the multiple prior failures to warn. But the recent
failure to warn about Covid-19 requires that we suspend our complacent
perspectives that all is just fine, and realize we’ve just lived through the
worst intelligence failure in the last 100 years.
In
my paper “Future Military Intelligence CONOPS and S&T Investment Roadmap
2035-2050: The Cognitive War” I called out the fact we should be implementing
the changes I recommended in the paper today.
And that it’s possible. I’ve reiterated
much of this in several blog posts recently. The full report can be downloaded
here - https://nsiteam.com/future-military-intelligence-conops-and-st-investment-roadmap-2035-2050-the-cognitive-war/. I reiterate those findings here, and include
the section on reorganization of the IC.
An overhaul is required now, as is the same for certain portions of the
DoD and other federal elements.
FINDINGS:
There are four major findings about operations
critical to the effectiveness and success of future of intelligence operations
in 2035-2050 and beyond. The findings apply broadly not only to military
intelligence, but the greater Intelligence Community (IC), the DoD, and by
default to several other elements of our federal national security
framework. However, realizing the Future
Intelligence CONOPS 2035-2050 projection assumes addressing the findings. If not, it highly probable intelligence
operations will continue to mimic the current reactive posture of today.
The four findings:
• The IC and DoD, created in
1947, continue to function in a primarily reactive posture, using the
industrial age processes of the era in which they were created. Our IC and DoD were created during
the industrial age, by the National Security Act of 1947. Their structure and
functional roles were respectively to prepare for war and providing Indications
and Warning (I&W). These functions
are inherently reactive. Proactive
influence requires significant forethought, well thought strategy, and
sustaining strategic planning priorities.
Strategy drives tactical efforts towards desired impact, influence and
outcome. However, our tendency
(perception and reality) is to chase the new “shiny objects” (e.g., AI/ML,
Cyber, etc.), throw solutions at the wall, see what sticks and then repeat. We tend to operate as glorified reactive
action officers, whereby we create crises, solve the immediate crises, pat
ourselves on the back, then repeat – vice, looking and planning strategically and
driving tactical efforts in line with strategy.
The processes remain mostly unchanged and stick in the industrial
age. In other words, we are waiting for
the paradigm or environment to change, rather than taking a proactive approach
and driving the change outcomes we desire.
To enable and provide future
successful and effective intelligence operations, we must move from a
predominately reactive to proactive posture.
·
Information & democratization of technology has changed the character
of warfare. A 2017
memorandum (Appendix A: Information as a Joint Function, September 15, 2017) from
the SECDEF created “Information” as the seventh joint function states
“…Information is such a powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of
national power. The advent of the internet, the expansion of information
technology…have dramatically impacted operations and changed the character of modem warfare...the elevation of Information
to a joint function impacts all operations and has implications across
doctrine, organization.” Despite the
plethora of new data and information sources, advances in information
technology to utilize such information, we continue to react/respond to every
new threat, new technology, new data, or new adversarial capability. Rather, we need to take a step back, think
through and clearly define the problem, the type of functions or approaches
that can be applied, identify and allocate the right type of expertise and
resources, and then ensure we follow the motto “form to function.” Our current approach tends to view technology
as part of the problem. We must understand that technology is not
the problem, it’s defining the problem.
• 2018 National Security and
Defense Security Strategies address the new character of warfare. The 2018 NSS states “…Majority of
adversary efforts in Competition phase (short of armed conflict) ... (are) challenging
our ability to deter aggression.” It is
in the cognitive realm we are losing the ideological war on multiple fronts, we
are losing our intellectual property, our adversaries are outmaneuvering us,
and we are failing to achieve overmatch because we focus solely on kinetic
options. While the kinetic is important,
if we lose the cognitive war, it is unlikely we will ever reach kinetic
action. The dangers surpass any
challenges we have faced in our history, as the NSS speaks to the new and
startling reality of modern warfare stating, “It is now undeniable that the
homeland is no longer a sanctuary.” Our biggest challenge, is that we are in
the midst of a cognitive war that will last a millennia or longer, and our
focus remains near solely on kinetic.
• Immediate investments are required
to enable the success and effectiveness of future intelligence operations in
2035-2050 and beyond. The key areas of investment include Architecture & Infrastructure;
Communication; Human Capital; Information Access & Cognition: Proactive
Influence/Predicative Analytics; and Integration / Leverage with others. These investments are required to build a
foundation that enables proactive influence and predictive analysis. They enable a foundation that is critical to
conducting cognitive warfare, outmaneuvering adversaries in the battle between
ideologies, and significantly shortening our OODA loop. In turn, such a foundation can enable and
optimize conduct of kinetic action, and enhance the effectiveness of
post-competition/kinetic efforts to stabilize an area or region. The greatest challenges to advancing
successful future intelligence operations is not our adversaries, their
capabilities, access to information, nor technology. We
must understand our biggest hurdles are cultural (policy) and structural
(organizational), requiring an overhaul of our production lines and building a
new factory floor.
OVERHAULING
THE FACTORY FLOOR
A New Factory Floor – Overhauling
and Retooling Our National
Security Apparatus
Today’s
DoD and IC were created out of the National Security Act of 1947. For these institutions to remain relevant, requires
a total overhaul of 1947 functional structure. The core functions they were built to perform
were I&W and preparation for war. The
shifts in the access, availability and ubiquitous volumes of technology and
information have changed the operating paradigm towards those nations, groups
or individuals which can more quickly leverage such access to advance their
goals and objectives – whether they be an ideology or power projection. It’s time we overhauled our production lines,
retool our factory floor, or even build a new factory.
Paradigm shifts are essential to ensuring abilities to
operate and succeed in the competition phase.
To advance desired outcome in the competition phase / cognitive domain,
an immediate rebalance of investments is required. The investments are required to ensure
intelligence is adequately positioned to support, enable and drive proactive
efforts in the competition phase, and to begin developing predictive analytic
capabilities as the norm. The cultural
and structural challenges in moving the current bureaucracy and cultures are
likely to require real consideration by fitting out new factory floors while we
guide the older constructs to end of their life cycle. The initial findings suggest is it imperative
for our nation to move from a current perpetual state of reaction to nation
states as Russia and China, and move to a proactive and predictive capability
to drive reaction to our desired outcome.
Achieving such a capability and expertise requires
policy, infrastructure, structural, authority and other changes. It requires an immediate rebalance of
kinetic investments to begin building the foundation for the cognitive
domain. It is critical to understand that “any” investment in advancing warfare
in the cognitive domain has a multifold benefit in the traditional kinetic (conflict)
phase and post-conflict phase. The
foundational intelligence data required to operate in the cognitive domain, if
developed properly will by default provide a pristine level of detail necessary
to effect kinetic actions and outcomes to our favor. And, just as importantly,
such a foundation also provides the value-added insights necessary to address
post conflict actions necessary to avoid use/or extract US forces enabling a
sustained peace.
We’ve
had a number of security shortfalls in our history. Perhaps we should take a broader lesson from
them, and understand one reason they occurred is we continue to use a 20th
century set of industrial based processes, capabilities and tradecraft rather
than a 21st century information based, technology enabled,
approach. Mr. Dan Gallington USNews
& World Report article on May 5, 2014 captured a good summary of these
mistakes in an article titled “How the U.S. Is Its Own Worst Enemy - The U.S.
has a tendency to forget some of its biggest security mistakes.” https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/05/14/us-security-strategy-fails-to-account-for-past-mistakes
.
Whether
you agree or disagree with these as being mistakes, we need to put ideas on the
table and start fixing a 50yr old plus foundation. Our foundation has cracked, shifted and in some
cases completely buckled. It’s time to
wake-up, before we wake-up to yet another unnecessary surprise. Given the democratization of technology, which
ill-willed people and groups do access, the next surprise could be
catastrophic. So having an open and
frank discussion of ideas now is a relatively cheap, logical, and at worst can
result in hurt egos or a papercut. We
need to drive informed discussion and solutions before another mistake. As our
nation is no longer a sanctuary, the next mistake may not be recoverable.
To
ensure the relevancy of our intelligence capabilities, it’s time to truly
shakeup the IC. Leaders must drive
change in culture, function, organizations and oversight. A few out of the box considerations include
splitting CIA, DIA and integrating all-source, human intelligence. Integrating S&T elements into a few vs 17
to optimize focus on most critical. More so, consider integrating NGA with the
CIA, DIA all-source, as it’s already close. No doubt, some elements of NSA would also be
folded in, leaving the cyber elements to fold into another form. Similarly, elements of the FBI, like the national
security division should also be integrated into this mix. But out of this integration, create a truly
open source only competitor(s). A
competitor with no access to national security systems or assets, focused on
information/knowledge and decision enabling. Why? Every soldier to policy maker
should be able to ask a question and get a like response in seconds - 85+%
solution, in battle or in hearings. Then
let that group compete against the all-knowing IC elements that retain access
to the most sensitive sources and methods.
Also, let that open source element inform the IC part, with accesses to
special capabilities, to understand the real value added by our national assets.
If we stay in our boxes, they will move,
but not by choice. True tradecraft and
organization reform must leverage our recent advances in integration.
Intelligence
Operations in 2035 cannot be optimized with the current IC construct or
framework. The IC has realized some
advances in efforts to optimize and integrate our intelligence elements, and there
may be a continued need for certain domain specific tradecraft and
expertise. However, such expertise is
best leveraged in cross-functional teams that integrate and optimize
information from across multiple intelligence disciplines / domains.
Continuation
of the 1947 industrial age paradigm that separates our IC elements into what I
endearingly call “titanium cylinders of sub-excellence” pushes each of these
stovepipes to compete for the same limited set of National and Military
Intelligence Program dollars (NIP, MIP) – rather than competing in efforts to
enable and optimize integration and production of the best most timely
intelligence. Measurement and Signatures
Intelligence (MASINT) is a perfect example of an intelligence domain that
offers significant benefits, remains wedded to decades old platforms, and is
likely the least understood. MASINT is
highly scientific and technical, and as such suffers from another problem –
MASINT places many senior intelligence officers and generals in an
uncomfortable position. Why? Because it requires understanding this highly
technical-based discipline. Historically,
it is much easier to avoid dealing with this discipline rather than being
educated and informed. In simple terms –
culturally, it’s easier to avoid the subject than look inept and be embarrassed
by not being able to explain or understand the subject.
For
the IC, it's time we put the 1950's industrial design on the wall, and build the
factory or factories we need for our future. The same is true for much of our national
security and defense enterprises. Paradigm
shifts are essential to ensuring abilities to operate and succeed in the
competition phase.
©
2020, Edward L Haugland, All Rights Reserved
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