Cognitive Warfare - Leveraging a Whole of Government Response
Leveraging a Whole of Government/National Response to Covid-19 to Advance
Dominance in the Cognitive Domain
The following paper is being sent as a call to action to a number of senior IC, DoD and Federal officials. If we fail to change, we will be changed, and it will not be the Republic we wish, but one that is either critically impaired, disadvantaged, or imposed on us due to lack of proactive thought and moving beyond our own cognitive dissonance. It is well past time for change. We define our future, or let others do it for us. What is your choice?
The purpose of this white paper is to sound the
alarm on a gaping hole in our nation’s ability to compete in the most critical
domain – the cognitive domain. The cognitive domain[1]
– is as the name suggests, is the domain that involves thought, reasoning, and
knowledge.
Our response in the
cognitive domain to the Covid-19 crises plays a big role in determining how
fast we progress and recover, or panic and extend the impacts. The objective of this paper is lay out and
understanding of the required foundation, and drive towards a sustained whole
of government/nation effort, while offering some immediate overt actions. I’ll leave several covert actions for another
discussion.
There are multiple ways for us to
leverage the current response not just to counter China’s disinformation
campaign but push them back from the world stage (e.g., their military,
economic and political expansion) in manner that requires them to focus their
resources internally.
We must stop reacting – which is
playing perpetual defense, a truly losing proposition. We must begin driving “proactive” influence
operations – in simple terms, driving others to react to us. We can do this in
the open, against regimes, specific individuals or companies or we can do it in
the darkness. Both approaches are
necessary. It is not only critical to
eliminating the threat, it is critical to the long-term survival of our
Republic and enabling a decisive advantage in the kinetic domain
First thing, we
must understand that we’ve been in a Cognitive War for the last several decades. It’s just that we took our eyes off this
perpetual competition in the cognitive domain post the fall of the Soviet
Union, only our adversaries wisely used our celebration of the “peace” dividend
to extend and grow their capabilities – both cognitive and kinetic. Their success is significant – as they’ve
stolen trillions of dollars in intellectual property, military research and
development (including design information for some of our prized weapon systems),
advanced commercial technologies and research while we also concurrently realigned
key aspects of our supply chain from protected shores – moving them into the
heart of our adversary’s lair. Our
adversaries built a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy and execute to
date a very successful cognitive war.
Our biggest challenge, is that we are
in the midst of a cognitive war that will last a millennia or longer, and our
focus remains near solely on kinetic.
Edward L Haugland, February 2019
The Covid-19 pandemic
exemplifies our challenges in the ongoing Cognitive War. Our choice is simple. We can change from
within to proactively drive strategy to success, or we can continue to react
and ignore the obvious gaps in this war to our detriment. This crises offers us a unique opportunity to
proactively close the gaping hole in our ability to compete and overcome our
adversaries in the cognitive domain. We
can do so by immediately beginning to counter the disinformation narratives,
and in parallel drive proactive influence operations to reinforce our economic,
political, military might and further advance the guiding light of humanity and
freedom we offer for the world to follow.
The threat we face
is expanding. It comes in many forms including
disinformation, propaganda and continued variety of asymmetric measures. Our adversaries seek to incite varied levels
of confusion and panic, severely disrupt our economy, military deployments and
readiness, destroy our citizen’s trust in government, and sow the seeds for
continued chaos.
Recently, several
United States Senators, and the Secretary of State, called for greater cross
government efforts to counter Covid-19 related disinformation and propaganda. The problem is our efforts remain mostly reactive,
slow and non-integrated – and therefore of limited effect. Because we lack the proper foundation,
integrated strategy and focus our options for proactive measures and influence
are limited. But they can be vastly expanded if we change our operating
paradigm.
This Cognitive War
is not new, nor are disinformation or other asymmetric measures. What is
different is our adversaries continued to advance using a whole of nation
approach, while we continue to admire
the problem. Our reactive posture
enables our adversaries to takes advantage of such crises to expand their
influence and disruption. In fact, after studying our ways, and mapping our
methods, our adversaries use our culture, reversed reward system and our
stove-pipes to out maneuver us in the cognitive domain.
We could respond
more effectively, but it is as if we are waiting for someone to step forward
and lead. So what’s stopping “us?” We must all lead, we must all collaborate,
and we must all focus on developing “a” strategy (not a hundred), a synced set
of global objectives based in the reality of the regions, common priorities,
with federated execution. We must get out
of our comfort zone and immediately begin counter punch in manner to disrupt
and cause them to react.
Our national
security apparatus has the right piece parts, but not the whole. We must change our current reward and
incentive systems which reward those who protect the silos, people and dollars
at all costs – and drive incentives and reward that enable the enterprise. I’ve driven such cultural change several
times in my career. There are several
other areas to address, but to do so requires us to retool significant portions
of our industrial age factory floor in order to operate in the information age.
Our foundation for military intelligence and current national intelligence is
inadequate to inform and enable proactive operations in the cognitive
domain. Some immediate wins are
achievable – but any effort must seek to ensure sustained, resilient and
strategic capability to operate in the cognitive domain.
…adversaries
and competitors became adept at operating below the threshold of open military
conflict and at the edges of international law. Repressive, closed states and
organizations, although brittle in many ways, are often more agile and faster
at integrating economic, military, and especially informational means to
achieve their goals…They are unencumbered by truth…They employ sophisticated
political, economic, and military campaigns that combine discrete actions. They
are patient and content to accrue strategic gains over time…as these
incremental gains are realized, over time, a new status quo emerges…The United
States must prepare for this type of competition…Our diplomatic, intelligence,
military, and economic agencies have not kept pace with the changes in the
character of competition[2].
While the kinetic capabilities are indeed
critical, if we lose the cognitive war, those assets will sit idle or
worse. The Covid-19 pandemic is a
wake-up call to our national security apparatus. We change, or we risk losing
this Cognitive War, and along with it our freedoms, republic, and democracy. History
is replete with examples of the complacent falling.
This white paper is my call to action, and
offer to assist, in building the strategy, whole of government/nation
enterprise, and implementation plans (term/strategic) to succeed. My unique background, expertise and
experience, across several IC, DoD, Federal and private sector elements, bring
proven ability in uniting, innovating, and collaborating to facilitate the
cultural and structural changes we need to succeed in this Cognitive War.
Unless we adjust our future CONOPS and S&T
Investments to account for the paradigm shifts that have occurred under our
feet, our nation and its intelligence operations will once again awaken too
late, to a different reality, which is likely to end badly with significant and
long-term impacts to our nation’s security and place as world leader.
I project such a negative and reactive outcome to
occur either because we lost the cognitive war totally, our adversaries succeed
undermining our institutions and democratic foundation to such an extent they
are no longer viable, or, because our efforts to counter in the cognitive
domain came too late.
If we fail to act in the cognitive domain, we will
likely end up in a major kinetic conflict resulting in devastating outcomes, in
physical and human toll – recovery is questionable.
Edward L. Haugland, 20 February 2019
Problem Statement
Persistent
Competition and Attack – The Cognitive War
The United States is faced with a
complex challenge. We are under persistent attack from our adversaries in the
information environment, for which we remain largely unprepared to respond other
than with short-term tactical efforts.
We lack a whole of nation approach, strategy and limited means to conduct
a sustained and comprehensive strategy of proactive influence measures against
one, let alone multiple, adversary. But,
it’s possible to change that dynamic.
For us to compete in the cognitive
war, we must change our operating paradigm, we must overcome four key problems:
·
We must move from a predominately
reactive to proactive posture. We must
fight further "upstream" in the information space prior to kinetic
action and potentially preventing kinetic action[3].
·
Define the real problem. Technology is not the problem, it’s defining
the problem. Technology is agnostic with
respect to the problem, it an enabler not nirvana, it should not be chased, it
should be applied.
·
Move from a kinetic to cognitive focus.
We are in the midst of a cognitive war, and our focus remains near solely on
kinetics. We must realize and act to
develop a cohesive strategy, comprehensive implementation plan, and capacity to
compete and enable sustained strategic and proactive influence operations.
·
Change, or be changed. Our biggest hurdles are cultural and
structural, as we remain stuck producing from an industrial age factory floor.
We must retool or overhaul of significant portions of our current factory floor
if we are to produce effective options to compete in the information age.
Our reactive posture is, put simply,
a loser. We inherently understand that
if you’re only playing defense (and reacting), and have no offense you’re chances
of a positive outcome decrease substantially.
The stakes are much higher this cognitive battle, because is if we lose,
we lose our Republic, our democracy, our freedoms and we lose the ability to
advance humanity worldwide.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The
National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security
environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open
international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition
between nations. These changes require a clear-eyed appraisal of the threats we
face, acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and a
transformation of how the Department conducts business. The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and
security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the
National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly
clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their
authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic,
diplomatic, and security decisions[4].
Our national security apparatus is
geared, structured and focused on kinetic solutions. While a critical enabler – kinetic solutions
in the Covid-19 crises or Cognitive Warfare have little application against the
multifaceted attacks that come via an onslaught of disinformation, propaganda,
theft of our intellectual property, infiltration into our research and
development efforts (industry, government, universities), and buying their way
into the most promising high tech for our defense, etc.
Our IC and DoD, created in
1947, continue to function in a primarily reactive posture, using the
industrial age processes of the era in which they were created. Our IC and DoD were created during the industrial
age, by the National Security Act of 1947. Their structure and functional roles
were respectively to prepare for war and providing Indications and Warning
(I&W). These functions are inherently reactive. Proactive influence
requires significant forethought, well thought strategy, and sustaining
strategic planning priorities. Strategy drives tactical efforts towards desired
impact, influence and outcome…To enable and provide future successful and
effective intelligence operations, we must move from a predominately reactive
to proactive posture[5].
The Covid-19 response demonstrated
that we have no enterprise game plan for dealing with the greater Cognitive War. The pandemic is a major symptom – that can be
replicated in other ways. What is
clearly evident, in this never-ending competition, is that most kinetic solutions
in this fight are mostly irrelevant – that is unless we immediately rebalance
our investments, interest, and efforts. The National and Defense Security
Strategies both speak to this challenge and accelerating multi-domain
operations. Critical to fully enabling our
kinetic might is winning in the cognitive domain.
In our current race in great power
competition, we seek overmatch in our kinetic capabilities. We’ve quickly found, yet once again, that
technology is not the problem. It was
there for the picking all along. Perhaps
not the full solution, but in the majority of cases a 50 to 85 percent solution
exists today, that can be refined, updated and moved close to the full solution
in a matter of months or years.
Information &
democratization of technology has changed the character of warfare. A 2017 memorandum from the SECDEF created
“Information” as the seventh joint function states “…Information is such a
powerful tool that it is recognized as an instrument of national power…Our
current approach tends to view technology as part of the problem. We must understand that
technology is not the problem, it’s defining the problem[6].
As a matter of fact, we had to go
back and dust off key technologies we just put aside. What was missing? We didn’t define the problem. We still
haven’t fully done due to our cognitive dissonance.
The key problem is we remain mostly
ineffective in the cognitive domain. As we understand this, and key functions
required to compete, we realize substantive expertise, capacity and capability
exist – and so do technology enablers. The
very same technologies sitting on the shelves are still there for the picking
to address this problem. There are
material and non-material solutions that can be applied readily including the
use of AI, advanced analytics, predictive analytics, big data processing, etc. But we must clearly define the core functions
to conduct proactive influence operations, the key data required, understand
what technology can be readily applied, and discern the key needs/gaps. We cannot do this in silos. We must do this via the enterprise (i.e.,
whole of government/nation) – for this problem requires an enterprise approach
that scales. The Covid-19 response is
and will remain mostly effective, because it is leveraging the enterprise to a
whole of nation response. Scaling the
solution via technology enablers enables many to conduct proactive operations
in parallel across on multiple fronts creating multiple dilemmas for our
adversaries.
We must move from operating as “Titanium Cylinders of Sub-Excellence,[7]”
to a fully integrated enterprise. The
Covid-19 pandemic gives us a taste of our potential future battlefield, and the
whole of nation response we are realizing is the right path. We must expand on
the current crises response, build a parallel effort in the cognitive domain,
or face a concerning future.
2018 National Security and Defense Security Strategies address
the new character of warfare.
The 2018 NSS states “…Majority of adversary efforts in Competition phase (short
of armed conflict) ... (are) challenging our ability to deter aggression.” It
is in the cognitive realm we are losing the ideological war on multiple fronts,
we are losing our intellectual property, our adversaries are outmaneuvering us,
and we are failing to achieve overmatch because we focus solely on kinetic
options. While the kinetic is important, if we lose the cognitive war, it is
unlikely we will ever reach kinetic action. The dangers surpass any challenges
we have faced in our history, as the NSS speaks to the new and startling
reality of modern warfare stating, “It is now undeniable that the homeland is
no longer a sanctuary.” Our biggest challenge, is that we are in the midst
of a cognitive war that will last a millennia or longer, and our focus remains
near solely on kinetic[8].
Time again we highlight our
cognitive dissonance. Whether in our approach during years in Afghanistan, or
currently waiting and reacting to what China, Russia or others push forth. A
key dynamic in the current Cognitive War is our President, who continually
launches proactive influence operations that catch our adversaries off guard.
The Covid-19 disinformation campaign was met with a direct counter punch by
this administration. However, this administration will eventually change, and
we owe this President and future a set of ready options.
It is time to wake up. The primary
competition is in the cognitive domain – and our capabilities, capacity and
strategy are wanting. By contrast, our
adversaries continue to advance a holistic strategy, enabled by a whole of
government and whole of society approach.
They are giving us multiple dilemmas by executing across multiple front
in this Cognitive War.
Our federal national security
apparatus was built and remains stuck in the industrial age. It operated effectively for its original
purpose. That purpose has been
served. The information age changed the
requirements. We are now competing in
the information age with relics of structure and policy – wholly unprepared for
this battle. We also remain culturally wedded to primarily kinetic solutions,
while the competition, challenge and negative impacts in this perpetual
competition come via competition in the cognitive domain.
INFORMATION
STATECRAFT
America’s competitors weaponized information to
attack the values and institutions that underpin free societies, while
shielding themselves from outside information. They exploit marketing
techniques to target individuals based upon their activities, interests,
opinions, and values. They disseminate misinformation and propaganda…U.S.
efforts to counter the exploitation of information by rivals have been tepid
and fragmented. U.S. efforts have lacked a sustained focus and have been
hampered by the lack of properly trained professionals. The American private sector has a direct
interest in supporting and amplifying voices that stand for tolerance,
openness, and freedom[9].
Within cognitive warfare fall a
variety of asymmetric tools that are coupled with culturally focused
information, psychological and influence operations – and includes focused use
of kinetics to message. Cognitive
warfare can and is highly effective, typically lower in cost and risk, yet tend
to drive the target to use an exponentially higher level of resources to respond
in a manner that is typically late nor change either the perception created or
negative impact desired.
The threat from Covid-19
exemplifies the magnitude of future potential impacts. While the current pandemic “may” have been an
accident or natural - our adversaries continue to research various forms of
bio-weapons, have one of the largest (if not largest) data base of DNA, and
have stolen tens of millions of national security personnel files, etc. Imagine the same course of events, but with
direct targeting of individual leaders across political, military, private sector
is a very real concern in the near-term future.
As such, it is imperative for us to leverage the efforts, and the
current whole of nation response, of this crises to advance a broader set of
capabilities, capacity, architecture, strategy and strategic implementation
plan now.
Immediate investments are
required to enable the success and effectiveness of operation in the Cognitive
Domain. The key areas of investment include
Architecture & Infrastructure; Communication; Human Capital; Information
Access & Cognition: Proactive Influence/Predicative Analytics; and
Integration / Leverage with others. These investments are required to build a
foundation that enables proactive influence and predictive analysis. They enable a foundation that is critical to
conducting cognitive warfare, outmaneuvering adversaries in the battle between
ideologies, and significantly shortening our OODA loop. In turn, such a
foundation can enable and optimize conduct of kinetic action, and enhance the
effectiveness of post-competition/kinetic efforts to stabilize an area or
region. The greatest challenges to advancing successful future intelligence
operations is not our adversaries, their capabilities, access to information,
nor technology. We must understand our biggest hurdles are cultural (policy)
and structural (organizational), requiring an overhaul of our production lines
and building a new factory floor[10].
Our Opportunity - Leveraging the
Covid-19 Crises & Response
The Covid-19 crises and response
offers an opportunity for us to change the paradigm in our favor. Covid-19 impacts include ceasing military
deployments, massive economic and supply issues, quarantine of thousands,
lockdown of millions, while combating asymmetric attacks on multiple
fronts. It’s taken several weeks for the
US to get our feet under us in responding – to this new information
environment. Yet, in parallel, we are
seeing the benefits of leveraging a whole of government /nation response. The unity of action, communication, sync
up/down the chain of command, across the public, etc. are very promising.
China is the source of this
pandemic. The epicenter we are being
told is recovering. However, we can
expect China will continue to thrash and attack on multiple fronts as it risks
losing not only the world’s perception of it as an economic power house, the
respect and trust of their people’s, and the potential loss of compliance with
the tyrannical government and despotic social credit system. The Xi government not only hid the initial
outbreak of the virus, the leadership hid during the first months of the
outbreak, as they arrested or jailed those who’ve sounded the alarm.
China’s leader, Xi, General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, came out of hiding after two months
only after China began a massive disinformation campaign to deflect blame. Why?
Because the leadership fears mass unrest, uprisings, and more as they slowly
realize the travesty unfolding in their country, the lies of their leadership,
and the loss of trust from the masses.
Fortunately, we’ve begun to counter
the disinformation narrative from China – on multiple fronts. Yet, these are tactical and reactive
responses. We must move to a more sustained and proactive posture, not just in
response to China but across the various adversaries. Therein lay our opportunities.
There are multiple ways for us to
leverage the current response not just to counter China’s disinformation
campaign and push them back from the world stage and their military, economic
and political expansion in manner that requires them to focus their resources
internally.
For us to achieve such efforts
requires immediate action – leveraging the whole of government and nation
response –to move from reacting to the narrative to controlling it. Controlling the narrative requires playing
offense, having a foundation to do so, and both aligning the enterprise to act
as one, while building additional capacity, capability and expertise – guided
by a strategy and strategic approach to implementation.
Until recently, there was little
response from the US. We sat in a
reactive posture, as China began a campaign to blame the virus on the US and
our military. The administration responded, labeling the
pandemic as the China flu, highlighting the lies and delayed notification,
while squarely placing the blame on China. This is a start, but it is far from
adequate. As we remain primarily reactive.
We must now take this several steps
further – we must immediately begin waging a strategic, long-term, proactive
influence campaign that drives adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran and ISIS
to refocus their limited resources internally.
If not, we face a reality of perpetual reaction - a losing proposition.
China, and our other adversaries,
are well positioned to further disrupt our economy to undermine our recent military
build-up; sow confusion in our upcoming national and local elections and continued
response to Covid-19, and foster or destroy public trust in government. They can, via these and other major
disruptions within our borders or overseas, inflict a thousand 1000 minor cuts,
that in total become deadly and unrecoverable.
Make no mistake, Covid-19 pandemic
has infected and killed many, but the real war against Covid-19 is taking place
primarily in the minds of people across the world. The pace and spread of information – factual
vs. disinformation- is the challenge. We
must stop reacting – which is playing perpetual defense, a truly losing
proposition.
We must begin driving “proactive”
influence operations – in simple terms, driving others to react to us. We can
do this in the open, against regimes, specific individuals or companies or we
can do it in the darkness. Both
approaches are necessary. It is not only critical to eliminating the
threat, it is critical to the long-term survival of our Republic and enabling a
decisive advantage in the kinetic domain.
The
more quickly we can act as an integrated enterprise (whether it begins at the
department or office level), then more we can leverage a whole of government /
nation approach in advancing national security goals in the Cognitive Domain
using a broader set of expertise, capabilities and capacity information
environment.
Despite
a realization of what is occurring across our national security apparatus, it
appears we remain mostly paralyzed, or we react via a thousand different
strategies, which in effect means no strategy.
STRATEGIC APPROACH
A
long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple
elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance,
intelligence, law enforcement, and military.
More than any other nation, America can expand the competitive space,
seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages
and they lack strength. A more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships,
American technological innovation, and a culture of performance will generate
decisive and sustained U.S. military advantages[11].
The
current crises with Covid-19 exemplifies the magnitude of the challenges we
face in competing with our adversaries in the Cognitive Domain. The Cognitive Domain is primarily an
ideological battle, using information, asymmetric warfare, gray zone
operations, disinformation and propaganda, psychological operations, etc.
The
United States must lead and engage in the multinational arrangements that shape
many of the rules that affect U.S. interests and values. A competition for influence exists in these
institutions. As we participate in them,
we must protect American sovereign_ and advance American interests and values.[12]
Knowing
when the virus was first detected; how rapidly it spread within China;
understanding the flow of Chinese and other human traffic from the epicenter
world-wide; knowing the migration flows and likelihood of increasing infection;
understanding the actual impacts into the closed societies of China, Iran, N.
Korea, etc.; watching the virus spread without any real condemnation,
accountability or holding China’s Xi for his country’s delayed engagement; and,
after several months having little ready to counter the massive disinformation
and propaganda campaign that Xi has unleased.
From likely November of 2019 to March of 2020 the west and the US
watched this unfold. We took little
action in advancing proactive influence measures that could have driven Xi to
take different actions.
In
simple terms, we missed an opportunity to drive proactive influence operations
that could likely have required China to focus its massive resources internally
for the next decade. If nothing else – we
could be providing relief to the demand on our operational forces while
creating additional room to maneuver in the Cognitive Domain.
For
example, if we undertook such a campaign across the 153 nations involved in the
Belt and Road initiative – it is likely we can cause China further
consternation in trying to maintain those relationships – given those countries
should be extremely concerned and/or frightened as:
1-
The infected are likely still migrating from China
to these other countries in order to keep their countries investments and efforts
on track;
2-
China seeks to use disruption to their advantage in
expanding their control over the local ports and economies; and,
3-
China continues to deflect their role, via
disinformation and other asymmetric campaigns, not only against the US but against
the local governments.
China
will continue to try and deflect blame via disinformation campaigns against the
US and others as it squashes internal rebellions, demands workers return to
factories, while word leaks out of additional disappearances of those who chose
to speak out against the Xi regime. What
are we doing to aid those seeking change?
Unfortunately,
we are not positioned properly to conduct such proactive influence operations. We do not have the proper information base,
capacity, level of expertise or integrated whole of government enterprise to
conduct such operations. However, we do
have the means to immediately counter the massive information campaign begun by
China, but to be successful we must integrate, sync and scale those
capabilities.
We must retool and overhaul our factory floor to
produce the desired results, not the results we wish.
Missing
from the discussion, given current confusion and panic, is that the much of the
approach applied to the Covid-19 response can also be effectively used to counter disinformation
and propaganda campaigns and enable conduct of proactive measures/influence
operations. In short order we can advance
calm, facts, and insights across the US while in parallel build our capacity,
capability and alliances to conduct a successful cognitive war.
America’s
ability to identify and respond to geostrategic and regional shifts and their
political, economic, military, and security implications requires that the U.S.
Intelligence Community (IC) gather, analyze, discern, and operationalize
information. In this
information-dominant era, the IC must continuously pursue strategic
intelligence to anticipate geostrategic shifts, as well as shorter-term
intelligence so that the United States can respond to the actions and
provocations of rivals[13].
So
where are we now? We will likely see
significant shut downs across the US at the federal, state, local and tribal
levels. We are seeing, slowly but
surely, a whole of government and nation response to stop the spread of the
Covid-19 virus.
As
such, it is imperative that we use this time wisely to build off of the whole
of government/ national effort being used to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic
and build a parallel construct and efforts to a broader information operations
strategy.
We
must begin to realign our Intelligence Community, elements of our DoD, academia
and private sector to invest in, build and deploy a cohesive enterprise
approach to operating in the Cognitive Domain.
Our
military intelligence foundation is pretty solid. But our understanding of the cultural,
political, military, criminal, social, medical, etc. networks, nuances, etc. by
region critical to effective influence operations is not. To operate effectively in the Cognitive
Domain, one has to understand the flow of information, the varied networks, who
is trusted, who is not, what are the primary sources of data used by the
public, the thieves, the proliferators, etc.
Such an understanding is required not just by region of the world, but
likely down to major cities, sub sections of the region, etc.
It
is not an insurmountable challenge. We can’t begin to eat the elephant
whole. So we must focus on the greatest
threats and challenges and build out from there. We must also look to divest and reinvest a
percentage of the DoD budget in the Cognitive Domain – immediately. In concert we need to begin immediate
collaboration, teaming, internal crowd sourcing and development of an investment
roadmap plan, regional and long-term strategies, and implementation plan.
We
must upgrade our diplomatic capabilities to compete in the current environment
and to embrace a competitive mindset…Our diplomats must be able to build and
sustain relationships where U.S. interests are at stake. Face-to-face diplomacy
cannot be replaced by technology.
Relationships, developed over time, create trust and shared
understanding that the United States calls upon when confronting security threats,
responding to crises, and encouraging others to share the burden for tackling
the world’s challenges. We must enable forward-deployed field work beyond the
confines of diplomatic facilities, including partnering with military
colleagues in conflict-affected states…In the ongoing contests for power, our
diplomats must build and lead coalitions that advance shared interests and
articulate America’s vision in international forums, in bilateral
relationships, and at local levels within states. Our diplomats need additional flexibility to
operate in complex conflict-affected areas…Diplomats must identify
opportunities for…people-to-people exchanges that create the networks of
current and future political, civil society, and educational leaders who will
extend a free and prosperous world[14].
Kinetic
to Cognitive Domain Investment - We have made a tremendous investment of
several hundred billion dollars for kinetic solutions in the Department of
Defense. As we weigh the need to
immediately prepare for a major conflict, or address the massive losses we’ve
seen in the current Cognitive War – we must also be real in that a portion of
the investment must be realigned immediately.
Investments
in the kinetic realm are mostly irrelevant in the ongoing competition and
Cognitive War. Long term, yes, we must
be ready for overmatch. But on our
current path, we are unlikely to ever reach the threshold for a major land
invasion of China, or Russia. We are
also highly unlikely to be able to even move the masses of equipment,
materials, and manpower as we lack the logistical means, resiliency, etc. So let’ be real, and not get stuck in our
“Titanium Cylinders of Sub-Excellence.”
Competition
in the cognitive domain requires a wholly new information foundation, cultural
insights, and understanding of networks (human and material) which escape our
national security apparatus fails to understand. And the kinetic solutions are more likely to
sit idle, unless we become involved in a major war. We’ve made some investment in this area, like
the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center. But they remain far from adequate, and
without an integrated enterprise approach will likely have minimal impact.
Our
adversaries realize this, and as such, they are pushing us to spend our
resources in an area in which we are likely to use. Who plans to invade China? Who plans to
invade Russia? Crickets. And our adversaries know this. But they also
know we remain stuck in an industrial age paradigm, in which we believe massive
force can win all battles. All this
occurs, while they steal trillions in IP, R&D, and S&T with little if
any repercussions. They send hundreds of
thousands of students to our shores to be educated, only to return to advance
efforts against our nation. They set up
front companies within our boundaries to perpetuate disinformation and
propaganda via social media, and when caught or shut down, just spring up
others.
Our
adversaries likely view our approach as a type of nirvana. Why not?
They are in fact driving us to spend billions on material solutions that
most likely will never be used in a major conflict/war, concurrently steal
their best ideas, research and development (R&D), science and technology
(S&T) and Intellectual Property (IP), and then upend our recovery and response
efforts for Covid-19 while concurrently sowing the seeds of disruption for the
upcoming elections – all via a whole of nation approach, with relatively
minimal cost, funded by selling products built from stolen technology. Nirvana – damn close. Our current approach is
not only irresponsible, it is deadly.
The
competitions and rivalries facing the United States are not passing trends or
momentary problems. They are
intertwined, long-term challenges that demand our sustained national attention
and commitment[15].
As I’ve written about this in a variety of forums
noting that the
“…intelligence operator and analyst will integrate
even further, and actually lead most major military operations. They will
integrate into whole of nation, whole of government, and broader allied /
coalition networks as mission requires – but bring the unique insights, tools,
and capabilities to detail the social, political, economic, biological,
chemical, nuclear, criminal, etc. networks, the players and their regular
actions and activities in a region, city, country or conglomerate that covers
several areas on the earth. Whether criminal, regional groups, political etc.,
the amount of data and types readily available either on individuals or on
groups will be more than sufficient to profile, assess and begin to layout trip
wires while supporting predictive analysis.[16]
Such a vision is
possible today – if we are willing to drive the structural (organizational) and
cultural (policy) changes required.
Again, we do not need to eat the elephant whole. It is best done via bite sized pieces,
piloting new structure, process and alignments.
Initial
Proposed Steps
I offer a few and
initial steps that we can take to quickly move from a reactive to a proactive
posture and conduct immediate proactive influence operations. We can do this by “facilitating” synergy and
alignment of efforts. This is not
impossible, and I’ve proven such efforts can be achieved with minimal impact to
current efforts with no real change.
Imagine what we can achieve with some modest change and alignment. This is not rocket science, it is social
science.
The initial
proposed steps offered below are only a start. The cover overt actions, I defer
covert and other actions to a separate discussion.
Initial steps are available for U.S. Government only - removed from this version.
Please see contact information below.
[1] Definition of cognitive 1: of,
relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual activity (such as
thinking, reasoning, or remembering) cognitive impairment; 2: based
on or capable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cognitive
[2]
p. 27-28 NSS
[3] These four findings are detailed in
the 20 February 2019 paper (with slight modifications) - Future Military
Intelligence CONOPS and S&T Investment Roadmap 2035-2050 - THE COGNITIVE
WAR, Edward L Haugland, The paper and my talk to OSD SMA J39 can be found at: https://nsiteam.com/future-military-intelligence-conops-and-st-investment-roadmap-2035-2050-the-cognitive-war/
[5]
Edward L Haugland, February 2019, Future Military Intelligence CONOPS and
S&T Investment Roadmap 2035-2050 - THE COGNITIVE WAR
[6] Ibid.,
[7] Edward
L Haugland coined this term in 2019 to describe the impenetrable individual
cultural tendencies of nearly all federal organizations to operate within their
organization or its subordinate elements vice operating as an integrated and greater
enterprise.
[8] Edward L Haugland, February 2019, Future
Military Intelligence CONOPS and S&T Investment Roadmap 2035-2050 - THE
COGNITIVE WAR
[9] 2018, National Security Strategy. p34-35
[10] Edward L Haugland, February 2019, Future
Military Intelligence CONOPS and S&T Investment Roadmap 2035-2050 - THE
COGNITIVE WAR
[13] Ibid, p.32
[16] Edward L Haugland, February 2019, Future
Military Intelligence CONOPS and S&T Investment Roadmap 2035-2050 - THE
COGNITIVE WAR
March 21, 2020
© 2020, All Rights Reserved, Edward L Haugland
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