An Open Letter to the National Security Advisor, Ambassador Robert O’Brien
Our national security apparatus is reactive, slow, and encumbered
by industrial age structure (organization) and culture (policy). We fail to educate and train our leaders in
defense, diplomacy, intelligence and other areas how to build, sustain and
change an organization to operate strategically, as part of an enterprise, and
enable sustained innovation. This
failure is reflected in our failure to identify and preclude strategic surprise
– whether Covid-19, 9-11, or other. It
also reflects our inability to achieve our desired outcomes in Afghanistan,
Iraq or with our adversaries like Russia, China and Iran. We do not operate as a whole of government
enterprise, and therefore fail to leverage not only national capabilities properly,
but team and leverage those of our allies as well.
We have the piece parts for a strong initial foundation, but
not the leadership to get there. This
must come via the White House and the NSA, as none of the other bureaucracy’s
leaders will feel comfortable going outside their box – even if it is only
collaborating and sharing of information.
The leadership must come from the top, to both facilitate and to direct.
To facilitate the art of the possible, and to direct when the culture resists.
Our National
Security Apparatus is Reactive & Focused near Solely on Kinetics:
Our nations’ security remains predominately reactive and over
reliant on kinetic solutions from the Department of Defense. Our Intelligence Community remains stuck
using tradecraft from the 1940’s and still views open source information as
another “INT” vice what it is – all source, open source. This while our adversaries continually outmaneuver
us in a variety of ways, whether ISIS or China.
They are defining our future, not we. And our methods of diplomacy,
while effective as times, are bogged down by a bureaucracy that requires six to
ten layers of sign off before one can engage other organizations – that’s US
federal organizations. In all cases, we
see an older an older set of professionals, as the young and/or mid-level staff
who are innovative depart out of frustration from being buried or bullied into
cultural compliance.
Leveraging a Whole
of Government / National Response:
The Covid-19 response provides an opportunity to
restructure, refocus and revive the effectiveness of our national security
apparatus. It also provides a rare
opportunity to leverage the increased “enterprise” approach we are undertaking
with our state, local and tribal partners to advance a true “whole of
government/nation” effort to prepare, preclude and proactively implement a
needed paradigm shift that brings us into the information age, reduces the size
of our bloated bureaucracy, and reinvests a few percent of the massive DoD
kinetic focused budget – to fund the transformation from a purely kinetic based
security posture, to a cognitive based approach. An approach were we can out maneuver our
adversaries in the Cognitive Domain, to succeed in the ongoing Cognitive War.
Moving Beyond
Cognitive Dissonance to Operate in the Cognitive Domain:
There are many examples of our cognitive dissonance. Here are two.
The first, from one of your predecessors H.R. McMaster:
The second from Adam Garfinkle:
https://thebulwark.com/big-government-small-government-pandemic-government/.
In both instances the authors, leaders in their own right,
layout varied issues for us to consider, and then a next step to consider.
First McMaster offers “Without effective pushback from the
United States and like-minded nations, China will become even more aggressive
in promoting its statist economy and authoritarian political model.”
And Garfinkle offers in suggesting we empanel a new
commission “What we can reasonably conclude already is that whatever
interagency set-up we have for dealing with pandemic crises doesn’t work well,
and that some of the deficiencies are largely independent of whoever happens to
be president. A major objective of a commission should be to learn from other
national systems that performed better than ours.”
The same type of thinking is ongoing in our DOD, IC and
Federal – and it won’t get us past go, it will likely bankrupt us more. Why?
An old saying applies here – “if keep trying the same thing and
expecting a different outcome, is the definition of insanity.” While both authors make a number of valid, or
not, points their thinking returns to industrial age models. One suggests effective pushback? What does
that mean? The other to setup a committee? Really, and whom shall we appoint to it,
those who offer the same thinking? The
point being that to move beyond our current set of “Titanium Cylinders of
Sub-Excellence,” a kinetic only focus, and to a structure that leverages – not constrains
– the information age and innovation, requires new thinking.
Addressing, and Eating the Elephant in the Room:
It is critical that we speak about the obvious – the elephant
in the room. As we admire the problem,
our adversaries use the time to advance whole of nation efforts that continue
to disrupt and reduce the effectiveness of our national security apparatus,
trust in our republic and trust in our governance.
As we speak to the obvious, we can than make it real, and
therefore remove the mystery of resolving those issues. Of course one cannot eat the elephant whole, but
it can be done fairly rapidly. An
overhaul of our IC is in order, as well as a few major segments of our DOD, DOS
and other federal elements.
- We must start with understanding the true critical essential functions – not what we’d like to protect. In doing so, one can define the “Minimal Essential Architecture” (MEA: piece parts of the whole) required to be successful.
- This includes defining new functions that enable us compete in the Cognitive Domain, the most challenging domain.
- We can then and only then, start to consider putting form (organizational structure) to function. In other words stay away from boxology until we know what the heck it is we are doing, by what means, to what ends, with what processes and people.
- From there we can begin to define the processes, expertise and link the ways and means to the desired end via a true whole of government strategy.
- We can then assess and refine our policy and laws so that we can enable the new structure, functions and processes to be efficient and effective.
- In doing so, we can build in parallel a true national security “implementation” strategy that can ensure our success in the ongoing Cognitive War with the likes of China, Russia and Iran. A strategy structure that fulfills our National Security Strategy.
- Then we can quickly conduct a bottoms up review of all federal programs against the MEA to assess value, benefit, risk and potential impact. As the MEA defines the absolutely critical mission essential parts of a new federal enterprise. Anything beyond is to be questioned. Anything beyond is to be considered discretionary.
- In this effort, we can rework the human capital to enable greater movement between federal (and state) elements, advance new forms of conscription that bring in new ideas, energy and awareness into the bureaucracies. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this task.
- Lastly, we can move towards a strategy and implementation plan that can be morphed into one that bridges administrations, is bipartisan, and is realistic in cost.
We need your leadership. We need the NSA to drive this ship,
with the support of the President. And
we need a different type of thinking – one that isn’t beholden to our
industrial age structures and cultures.
This is one of my many calls to action from within the IC, DOD and
Federal government as a public servant for over thirty-years, and now post
retirement from government, so that I may be more outspoken. It is time for you to lead by facilitating a
sustained whole of government effort. I
and many others are pushing this wet noodle up the hill, we’d appreciate you
grabbing the other end and pulling.
v/r edward l haugland
© Copyright 2020, Edward L Haugland, All Rights Reserved
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